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Abstract
For decades, psychologists and neuroscientists have hypothesized that the ability to perceive
emotions on others’ faces is inborn, pre-linguistic, and universal. Concept knowledge about
emotion has been assumed to be epiphenomenal to emotion perception. In this paper, we report
findings from three patients with semantic dementia that cannot be explained by this “basic
emotion” view. These patients, who have substantial deficits in semantic processing abilities,
spontaneously perceived pleasant and unpleasant expressions on faces, but not discrete emotions
such as anger, disgust, fear, or sadness, even in a task that did not require the use of emotion
words. Our findings support the hypothesis that discrete emotion concept knowledge helps
transform perceptions of affect (positively or negatively valenced facial expressions) into
perceptions of discrete emotions such as anger, disgust, fear and sadness. These findings have
important consequences for understanding the processes supporting emotion perception.
The ability to perceive discrete emotions such as anger, disgust, fear, sadness, etc. in other
people is a fundamental part of social life. Without this ability, people lack empathy for
loved ones, make poor social judgments in the boardroom and classroom, and have
difficulty avoiding those who mean them harm. The dominant paradigm in emotion research
for the past 40 years, called the “basic emotion” approach, assumes that humans express and
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detect in others discrete emotions such as anger (i.e., a scowl), sadness (i.e., a pout), fear
(i.e., wide eyes), disgust (i.e., a wrinkled nose), or happiness (i.e., a smile) (Ekman et al.,
1987; Izard, 1971; Matsumoto, 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2008). Scientists largely assume that
this detection ability is inborn, universal across all cultures, and psychologically primitive
(i.e., it cannot be broken down into more basic psychological processes). Concept
knowledge about discrete emotion that is represented in language is assumed to be irrelevant
to the ability to perceive discrete emotion in faces (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). This “basic
emotion” view is a standard part of the psychology curriculum taught at universities in the
Western world, and drives research in a range of disciplines including cognitive
neuroscience (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998), interpersonal communication and conflict
negotiation (Kuppens et al., in press) and psychopathology (Fu et al., 2008; Kohler et al.,
2010). The US government also relies on this framework to train security personnel to
identify the covert intentions of people who pose a threat to its citizens (Burns, 2010;
Weinberger, 2010).
Emotion concepts shape discrete emotion perception
Despite the prevalence of the basic emotion view, growing evidence suggests that discrete
emotion perception is not psychologically basic, and in fact depends on more “elemental”
psychological processes such as 1) perceptions of basic affective valence in faces (i.e.,
detecting facial behaviors that correspond to positive v. negative v. neutral feelings), and 2)
the ability to make meaning of those affective facial behaviors using concept knowledge
about discrete emotion (i.e., the set of concepts about discrete emotion that a person knows,
which are relevant to a given culture; Barrett, Lindquist, et al., 2007; Lindquist & Gendron,
2013).1
A growing literature demonstrates that accessible emotion concept knowledge shapes how
individuals make meaning of affective facial expressions as instances of discrete emotions
such as “anger,” “disgust,” “fear,” etc. For instance, two-year old children, who possess only
the rudimentary concepts of “sad” and “happy,” can correspondingly only perceive faces in
terms of affective valence (e.g., they categorize all unpleasant faces, including scowling,
pouting, wide eyed and wrinkle nosed faces as “sad” and all smiling faces as “happy”). Yet
as children gradually acquire additional discrete emotion concepts over the course of
development (e.g., “anger,” “disgust,” “fear”), they are subsequently able to perceive
unpleasant faces (pouts, scowls, wide eyes, wrinkled noses) as instances of distinct discrete
emotion categories. For instance, by age seven, when children have learned the meanings of
“sad,” “anger,” “fear” and “disgust” they reliably perceive pouting faces as “sad,” scowling
faces as “anger,” wide eyed faces as “fear,” and wrinkle nosed faces as “disgust” (Widen &
Russell, 2010).
The role of concept knowledge in emotion perception is not limited to early development,
however. Evidence suggests that even healthy adults rely on concept knowledge during
emotion perception tasks, regardless of whether that task explicitly involves labeling of
1In this paper, as in our prior work, we use the terms “affect” or “affective valence” to refer to hedonic tone (i.e., positivity, negativity,
and neutrality). We use the term “discrete emotion” to refer to instances of specific emotion categories such as anger, disgust, fear, etc.
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faces or not. For instance, healthy adults from most cultures can easily select the word that
best matches the expression with a relatively high degree of agreement (e.g., the word
“anger” would best match a scowling face; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002) when emotion word
labels are explicitly given in an experimental task (e.g., a posed facial expression is
presented with a set of emotion adjectives). Yet it is possible to dramatically impair discrete
emotion perception—and thus reduce accuracy on a task such as this—by merely
manipulating those adults’ ability to access the meaning of discrete emotion words. This
even occurs in tasks that do not explicitly require labeling of faces. For instance, disrupting
access to the meaning of discrete emotion concepts such as “anger,” “disgust,” or “fear,” by
having participants repeat other words during the discrete emotion perception task (called
“verbal overshadowing”), impairs participants’ ability to distinguish between facial
portrayals of anger and fear as categorically different emotional expressions (Roberson &
Davidoff, 2000). The simple removal of discrete emotion words from the experimental task
produces a similar effect (Fugate et al., 2010). An experimental manipulation that
temporarily renders the meaning of an emotion word inaccessible—called semantic satiation
—also reduces the speed and accuracy of discrete emotion perception (Lindquist et al.,
2006). For instance, after repeating a relevant discrete emotion word (e.g., “anger”) out loud
30 times until the meaning of the word becomes temporarily inaccessible, participants are
slower and less accurate to judge that two scowling faces match one another in emotional
content (Lindquist et al. 2006). Since the emotion judgment task used in Lindquist et al.
(2006) might implicitly require use of discrete emotion words, we replicated and extended
these findings more recently using a perceptual priming task that does not require the use of
emotion words. We found that following semantic satiation of a relevant discrete emotion
word (e.g., “anger”), a face posing discrete emotion (e.g., a scowling face) is literally seen
differently by participants. For instance, the emotional face perceived when the meaning of
an emotion word is inaccessible (e.g., a scowling face perceived after semantic satiation of
the word “anger”) does not perceptually prime itself on a later presentation (e.g., the same
scowling face perceived when the word “anger” is accessible; Gendron et al., 2012).
Although these careful experimental manipulations produced data consistent with the
hypothesis that concept knowledge about emotion shapes instances of positive and negative
facial muscle movements into perceptions of discrete emotions, a powerful test of this
hypothesis is to examine discrete emotion perception in people who have naturally occurring
and permanently impaired concept knowledge.
A case study of discrete emotion perception in semantic dementia
In the present report, we assessed discrete emotion perception in individuals with a
neurodegenerative disease that impairs access to and use of concept knowledge. Semantic
dementia is a progressive neurodegenerative disease—one form of primary progressive
aphasia (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011b)—that results in notable impairments in concept
knowledge availability and use (Hodges & Patterson, 2007). Research on semantic dementia
has traditionally documented impairments to conceptual knowledge for objects, plants, and
animals (Bozeat et al., 2002; Hodges et al., 2000; Lambon Ralph et al., 2009). Such
impairments are associated with relatively focal (typically left-lateralized)
neurodegeneration in the anterior temporal lobes, which are hypothesized to be hubs in a
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distributed network subserving semantic memory and conceptual knowledge (Binder et al.,
2009; Lambon Ralph et al., 2009; Visser et al., 2010). Early in the course of the disease,
semantic dementia is associated with the very specific inability to understand the meaning of
words, amidst normal visual processing, executive control, comportment and behavior.
Sometimes termed the “temporal lobe” variant of frontotemporal dementia (FTD), semantic
dementia is a sub-class of the broader diagnosis of frontotemporal dementia. As such, some
patients can develop a broader set of lesions in frontal or other temporal lobe regions
affecting brain areas involved in other psychological processes such as executive control
(e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) or visuo-spatial processing (e.g., hippocampus,
perirhinal cortex). Due the heterogeneity inherent in frontotemporal dementia, we carefully
selected three patients who had specific anatomical and behavioral profiles of semantic
dementia; this allowed us to perform a very precise test of our hypothesis about emotion
perception. First, we selected patients with a specific neurodegeneration pattern: we selected
only those patients with relatively focal lesions to the anterior temporal lobes. Second, we
selected patients displaying specific behavioral patterns: we performed a host of
neuropsychological tests and control experimental tasks to ensure that the patients in our
sample had semantic deficits but relatively preserved executive function and visuospatial
processing. To rule out that patients had more general affective abnormalities that might
result in impaired discrete emotion perception, we also relied on clinical assessments to
ensure that patients had normal comportment and behavioral approach and avoidance.
Together, these rigorous inclusion criteria allowed us to perform a strong test of the
hypothesis that impaired conceptual knowledge results in impaired discrete emotion
perception.
Growing evidence documents deficits in emotion perception in semantic dementia (Calabria
et al., 2009; Rosen et al., 2004), but no research to date has specifically addressed the
hypothesis that impairments in concept knowledge contribute to impairments in discrete
emotion perception. Patients with semantic dementia have difficulties labeling facial
expressions of emotion (Calabria et al., 2009; Rosen et al., 2004), but such findings are
typically interpreted as evidence that patients can understand the meaning of emotional faces
but perform poorly on experimental tasks due to an inability to manipulate labels (Miller et
al., 2012). If this were the case, language would have an impact on the communication of
discrete emotion perception, but not the understanding of emotional facial behaviors. Yet the
possibility remains that concept knowledge plays a much more integral role in discrete
emotion perception by helping to transform perceptions of affective facial expressions into
perceptions of discrete emotions. In this view, conceptual knowledge for emotion is
necessary for discrete emotion perception to proceed. To test this hypothesis, we use a case
study approach to test emotion perception abilities in three patients with semantic dementia.
Because these three patients have relatively isolated impairments in semantic memory
without impairments in executive function, visuospatial abilities, comportment, or
behavioral approach or avoidance, they provide an opportunity to perform a targeted test of
the hypothesis that concept knowledge is necessary for discrete emotion perception.
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To assess whether concept knowledge is important to normal discrete emotion perception,
we designed a task in which patients with semantic dementia (who have difficulty using
semantic labels) could demonstrate their discrete emotion perception abilities without
relying on linguistic emotion concepts. We thus designed a sorting task that would assess
spontaneous emotion perception and not emotion labeling per se. Patients were presented
with pictures of scowling, pouting, wide eyed, wrinkle nosed, and smiling faces, as well as
posed neutral faces and were asked to freely sort the pictures into piles representing as many
categories as were meaningful. We used posed depictions of discrete emotions (the standard
in most scientific studies of emotion perception) because they are believed to be the clearest
and most universally recognizable signals of discrete emotions by basic emotion accounts
(Ekman et al., 1987; Matsumoto, 1992).
To rule out that patients had other deficits that would impair their performance on the
discrete emotion sort task, we also asked them to also perform a number of control sort
tasks. In these control sort tasks, patients were asked to sort the faces into six piles anchored
with six numbers (a number anchored sort), to sort the faces into six piles anchored with six
posed discrete emotional facial expressions (a face anchored sort), to sort the faces into six
piles anchored with six emotion category words (a word anchored sort), or to free sort the
faces by identity (an identity sort). Whereas the number and word anchored sorts ruled out
the alternate hypothesis that patients could perform a discrete sort when cued to the correct
number or names of categories, the face anchored and identity sorts ruled out the more
general alternative interpretations that 1) patients did not understand how to sort pictures, 2)
that they had visual impairments that prevented them from perceiving differences between
faces (i.e., prosopagnosia or more general visuospatial deficits), 3) or that they had cognitive
impairments in executive function that would cause them to perform poorly on any sorting
task. Patients’ performance on these sorts,along with our neuropsychological findings (see
supplementary materials), rules out alternate explanations of patients’ performance on the
discrete emotion sort tasks.
In line with our hypothesis that normal discrete emotion perception relies on concept
knowledge of emotion, we predicted that patients’ semantic deficits would be associated
with difficulty perceiving same-valence discrete emotional facial expressions (e.g., anger vs.
fear vs. disgust vs. sadness). Yet mirroring the developmental findings that infants and
young children, who have limited conceptual knowledge of emotion, can detect positive and
negative affect on faces (for a review see, Widen & Russell, 2008b), we predicted that
patients with semantic dementia would have relatively preserved perception of positive vs.
negative vs. neutral expressions (i.e., affective valence). This hypothesis would be supported
in our study if healthy control adults, who have access to conceptual knowledge of emotion,
spontaneously produced six piles for anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness and neutral
expressions and rarely confused multiple negative faces for one another (e.g., would not
treat pouting, scowling, wide-eyed and wrinkled nose faces as members of the same
category by placing them in the same pile). Patients, on the other hand, would spontaneously
sort faces into piles corresponding to positive, negative, and neutral affect and would
additionally make errors in which they confused multiple negative faces for one another
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(e.g., would treat pouting, scowling, wide-eyed and wrinkled nose faces as members of the
same category by placing them in the same pile)2. In contrast, a basic emotion hypothesis
would predict that emotion perception is a psychologically primitive process evolved from
ancestral primate communicative displays (Lewis, 1993; Sauter et al., 2010) that does not
rely on concept knowledge (cf., Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). If this hypothesis were supported,
we would not observe a difference between control participants’ and patients’ sorts. At the
very least, if patients were impaired in discrete emotion perception as compared to controls,
a basic emotion view would not predict that patients would show maintained perception of
affect (positive, negative and neutral valence). According to the basic emotion view, the
perception of discrete emotion is more psychologically fundamental than the perception of
affect, meaning that discrete emotion perception should precede affect perception (e.g., a
person has to know that a face is fearful to know it’s negative; Keltner & Ekman, 2000).
Methods
Participants
We studied three patients (EG, a 70-year old right-handed male; FZ, a 64-year old right-
handed male; and CP, a 53-year old right-handed female) with a relatively rare form of
neurodegenerative disorder known as semantic dementia. Each patient was diagnosed with
semantic dementia by a team of neurologists based on their behavioral symptoms,
neuroanatomy, and performance on neuropsychological assessments. Each patient presented
to the clinic with gradually progressive problems recalling the meaning of words (i.e.,
anomia) and was found to have a semantic memory deficit on neuropsychological testing.
Neuropsychological tests were collected in a hospital clinic; we rely on the
neuropsychological data collected in that setting. Neuropsychological tests revealed that
patients had relatively specific semantic deficits amidst normal intellectual abilities,
executive function, and visuospatial performance. No patient exhibited evidence of impaired
recognition of visual objects (i.e., visual agnosia) or faces (i.e., prosopagnosia). See
supplementary online materials (SOM) for case histories and neuropsychological test results
confirming the specificity of each patient’s semantic impairments. Consistent with the
diagnosis of semantic dementia, structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging revealed relatively
focal left temporal pole atrophy in each patient’s brain (see Figure 1, a–c).
Patients’ performance was compared to the performance of 44 age-matched control
participants (Mage = 74.14, SDage =5.89), who also performed the discrete emotional free
sort. Control participants were recruited from the community and participated at a local
university. We did not include a patient control sample because it was difficult to find a
sample of patients with another form of dementia whose performance would demonstrate a
clear double dissociation on the sort tasks we employed. For instance, patients with other
types of neurodegenerative diseases (e.g., Behavioral Variant Frontomteporal Dementia;
Alzheimer’s Disease) can perform poorly on the type of sort task we used for numerous
reasons including attentional deficits, behavioral impulsivity, or impairments in affective
2Unfortunately, since there were not multiple basic-level categories within the superordinate category of “positive,” we could not
conduct a comparable analysis for positive faces. This is because most basic emotion accounts consider happiness to be the only
positive basic emotion.
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valuation. As a result, we compared the performance of our semantic dementia sample
directly to healthy controls, while also instituting multiple control tasks within the semantic
dementia sample to rule out alternate explanations for our findings. This approach was
warranted for several reasons. First, the aim of our study was not to unveil new defining
characteristics of semantic dementia, but rather to isolate those characteristics already
known to exist in order to test a specific hypothesis about emotion perception. Second, we
instituted a number of within-subjects control tasks with our patient sample to rule out other
explanations of our findings. Notably, both of these approaches are taken in other published
case studies of patients with semantic dementia (Lambon-Ralph et al. 2010).
Materials
Face sort stimuli—The set contained posed, caricatured, pictures of facial expressions
corresponding to 6 different emotion categories (anger=scowl, sadness=pout,
disgust=wrinkled nose, fear=wide eyes, happiness=smile, neutral=relaxed facial muscles).
Images were selected from the IASLab Face Set (www.affective-science.org) and the
Research Network on Early Experience and Brain Development Face Set (2006, NimStim
Face Stimulus Set; http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm). A long version of the task
contained 20 identities and a short version contained 6. All identities were European
American and an equal number of male and female identities were used. Patients did not sort
faces systematically by gender on the emotion sort tasks, so we do not discuss the gender of
faces further.
Number anchors—Six pieces of 8.5 × 11 paper containing the numbers 1–6 served as
pile anchors.
Face anchors—Six pictures of a single woman from the NimStim Face Stimulus set
(Tottenham et al., 2009) posing a scowl, wrinkled nose, wide eyes, pout, smile and a posed
neutral face served as pile anchors.
Word anchors—Six pieces of 8.5 × 11 paper containing the words “anger,” “disgust,”
“fear,” “happiness,” “sadness” and “neutral” served as pile anchors.
Procedure
The discrete emotion perception tasks were designed to probe changes in affective
processing and/or discrete emotion perception. The free sort procedure was designed to
identify the categories that patients spontaneously perceived in posed facial expressions with
minimal constraints and without asking patients to explicitly use emotion words. As such,
we asked participants to sort into the categories they found “meaningful.” This open-ended
instruction necessarily ensured that the emotion categories hypothesized to guide perception
were not explicitly invoked by the experimental procedure at the outset of the task.
Fortunately, the performance of control participants ensured that alternate explanations of
the free sort findings were not possible. All control participants immediately understood that
discrete emotion categories were the most meaningful way to sort the faces (despite the fact
that other categories such as identity and gender were also possible). Furthermore, testing
patients on subsequent control tasks ensured that patients did not have difficulty following
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instructions, as they were able to sort by perceptual features of the expressions when cued.
Importantly, additional control tasks (constraining the number of piles patients were told to
make, and cueing patients with the names of emotion categories) did not help their
performance, which would be predicted if impaired performance was simply due to the
interpretation of open-ended instructions. These additional tasks thus helped to clarify the
interpretation that patients’ semantic deficits led to impairments in discrete emotion
perception. Finally, the identity sort ruled out that patients did not understand how to sort
faces, had a visual impairment that prevented them from perceiving differences between
faces (i.e., prosopagnosia or other visuospatial deficits), or had cognitive impairments in
executive function that would cause them to perform poorly on any sorting task.
Emotional free sort—Participants were handed the face sort stimuli and were asked to
freely make piles to represent the number of meaningful categories they perceived in the set.
Patients were told, “I am going to give you a pile of pictures. What I want you to do is
organize them into groups that are meaningful to you. You can create as many piles as you
need to. At the end, each pile should be sorted so that only one type of picture is included. It
is sometimes helpful to look through the set of pictures first before you begin sorting. This is
not timed, so feel free to take as long as you need. You can also change the piles while you
are sorting or at the end—it is up to you. Do you have any questions?” Patients were then
asked to sort the pictures into piles on the table. Following completion of the sort, the
researcher asked the patient several questions including 1) “Can you tell me about how you
sorted the pictures?” Since all patients indicated that they had sorted by feeling, the
researcher next asked 2) “How confident are you that all of the people in each pile feel
exactly the same way? Not confident, somewhat confident or very confident?” Next, the
researcher went through each pile with the participant and asked, “What is in this pile?” If
the patient responded with emotion or affect words (e.g., “happy,” “disgust,” “fear” or
“good,” “bad”), the researcher asked the patient to label the facial action on the next round
by asking, “What expression is on these people’s faces?” If the patient never used an
emotion word to describe the pile, the researcher prompted, “What emotion are the people in
this pile feeling?” In the present report, all patients understood the instructions well and each
immediately sorted the faces into piles representing the affective meaning of the face
(positive, negative or neutral). Once the content of each pile was recorded, the researcher
shuffled the faces and moved on to the next task.
Number anchored sort—The researcher indicated that the patient should make six piles
by laying down the six number anchors. This control task cued the patient to the fact that
there were six perceptual categories in the face set and ruled out the alternate interpretation
that participants merely did not understand that we wanted them to sort into six piles.
Patients were told, “Now I want you to again sort these pictures based on feeling, but this
time I am going to ask you to make 6 piles. I have 6 different numbers that I will lay out for
you so that you can keep track of how many piles you create. Again, I want you to sort based
on feeling. In each pile, there should be only people who feel the same way. At the end, each
pile you’ve made should have pictures of only people who feel the same way. Are these
instructions clear?”
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Face anchored sort—The researcher indicated that the patient should make six piles by
laying down the six face anchors. This control task cued the patient to the fact that we were
asking them to sort into six categories based on the perceptual features of the faces in the
set. It ruled out the alternate interpretations that participants merely did not understand that
we wanted them to sort based on the facial expressions or that patients had difficulty
visually detecting differences in the expressions. Patients were told, “Now I want you to
again sort these pictures based on feeling, but this time I am going to start the piles for you.
Here are six different pictures of the same woman. The woman feels differently in each of
the pictures. Again, I want you to sort the pictures into these piles I have already started
based on feeling. In each pile, there should be only people who feel the same way. At the end
of your sorting, each pile you’ve made should have pictures of only people who feel the
same. Are these instructions clear?” After patients made piles, the task proceeded as in the
emotion free sort.
Word anchored sort—The researcher indicated that the patient should make six piles by
laying down the six word anchors. This cued the patient to the names of the six emotion
categories in the face set. Adding words to the experimental task typically helps healthy
adults become more accurate at discrete emotion perception (Russell, 1994). The word-
anchored sort task therefore ruled out several important alternative explanations of our data.
First, it ruled out the possibility that patients were able to perceive and sort by discrete
emotion but had not done so in the free sort task because the instructions were too vague or
because they found other categories to be more relevant. Second, this control task ruled out
the possibility that participants had intact concept knowledge but performed poorly on the
free sort because they didn’t have the ability or the motivation to spontaneously access those
emotion concepts.
To start the sort task, the researcher stated, “Now I want you to again sort these pictures
based on feeling, but this time I am going tell you what should be in each of the 6 piles. I
have 6 different words that I will lay out for you so that you can keep track of the piles. In
each pile, there should be only people who feel the same way. In this pile, I want you to sort
people who feel happy. In this pile, I want you to sort people who feel neutral. In this pile, I
want you to sort people who feel angry. In this pile, I want you to sort people who feel
fearful. In this pile, I want you to sort people who feel sad. In this pile, I want you to sort
people who feel disgusted. At the end of your sorting, each pile you’ve made should have
pictures of only people who feel the same way. Are these instructions clear?” After patients
made piles, the task proceeded like the emotion free sort.
Identity free sort—The researcher instructed the patient to sort into piles based on
identity. If patients were unable to do this accurately, then this would be evidence that they
had other cognitive or visual deficits that would make them unsuitable participants for the
emotion perception task. The researcher stated, “In this pile there are pictures of a bunch of
people. There are several pictures of each person in the pile. What I would like you to do is
to sort the pictures into piles based on their identity. You can create as many new piles as
you need to. At the end, each pile you’ve made should have pictures of only 1 person in it.
Are these instructions clear?” When the patient finishes, the researcher asks, “How
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confident are you that all of the people in each pile are the same exact person? Not
confident, somewhat confident or very confident?”
Data Analysis
To assess patients’ performance, we computed the number of piles they created on the
emotional free sort and the percentage of errors (where patients confused one type of face
for another). Errors were the percentage of faces portraying a different expression from the
predominant expression in the same pile (e.g., the number of scowling and wide eyed faces
in a pile consisting predominantly of pouting faces). Error types were computed by
determining the overall number of within-valence (e.g., one negative face confused with
another) or cross-valence (e.g., one negative face confused with a neutral face) errors. See
Table 1 for a list of error types.
We used a modified t-test (Anderson et al., in press) to statistically compare patients’ error
percentages to those of the 44 control participants. This method is frequently used in case
studies to compare patient samples to control samples.
Results and Discussion
Consistent with our hypothesis that concept knowledge is necessary for normal emotion
perception, control participants who had intact concept knowledge for discrete emotion
spontaneously perceived scowling, pouting, wide-eyed, wrinkle-nosed, smiling faces, and
neutral faces, as instances of anger, sadness, fear, disgust, happiness and neutral emotion.
This occurred despite the open-ended nature of our instructions to sort the categories into
those they found most “meaningful.” Control participants on average produced six (or more)
piles to represent the discrete emotion categories in the set and tended not to confuse
negative faces with one another in their piles (i.e., had low neg-neg error rates; see Table 1).
The majority of control participants (61%) spontaneously produced either six or seven piles
and 96% of control participants produced six or more. Only two control participants (4%)
produced fewer than six piles on the sort task; one participant produced four piles and one
produced five. Notably, no control participants produced three piles. That only one
individual from the control sample (2.2%) spontaneously produced four piles on the sort
task, and none produced three, stands in stark contrast to the fact that 100% of our patient
sample produced four or fewer piles on the sort task. See Table 1 for controls’ and patients’
mean error rates and Figure 3 for an example of a control participant’s performance.
Contrary to control participants, and as predicted, patients with semantic dementia, who
have impaired concept knowledge, did not spontaneously perceive discrete emotion on
faces. The patients in our case study demonstrated preserved affect perception, however,
consistent with our hypothesis that affective processing would be intact even in the presence
of impaired conceptual knowledge. One interpretation of these findings is that patients were
able to perceive discrete emotion on faces, but merely thought that affect was the more
“meaningful” category. Yet patients’ performance on the various control tasks effectively
rules out this alternate interpretation. For instance, no patient was able to sort by discrete
emotion when asked to sort the faces into six categories, or when explicitly asked to sort into
piles for “anger,” “disgust,” “fear,” “sadness,” “happiness” or “neutral.” Another
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interpretation of our findings is that affect perception was merely easier for patients than
discrete emotion perception. Again, the performance of the control participants, along with
the performance of the patients on the various control tasks, rules out this alternate
interpretation. If affect perception was easier than discrete emotion perception, then control
participants could also have taken the “easy” route and sorted faces by affect as well, but
they did not. More to the point, patients continued to sort by affect on the control tasks, even
when these tasks provided extra structure and removed cognitive load by cuing patients to
the number, appearance, and even names of the discrete emotion categories. The most
parsimonious explanation of our findings is thus that participants had a preserved ability to
perceive affect but were unable to perceive discrete emotion on faces.
We begin by discussing the findings from patient EG, who was our first case, and as a result,
performed fewer control tasks than subsequent cases. We next discuss the findings from
patients FZ and CP, who performed all the control tasks in our battery.
Patient EG
Emotional free sort
Consistent with our hypothesis that concept knowledge is necessary for discrete emotion
perception, but not affect perception, EG free sorted emotional facial expressions into three
piles (see Figure 4) that he later labeled “happy,” “nothing” and “rough.” Compared to
controls, EG made more errors in which he confused negative (scowling, pouting, wide-eyed
and wrinkle-nosed faces) faces with each other [t(43)=2.78, p<.01; see Table 1], indicating
that he could not perceive the differences between expressions for anger, disgust, fear, and
sadness.
Face-anchored sort
EG’s inability to distinguish negative discrete emotional expressions from one another was
not due to an inability to detect the facial actions of pouting, scowling, wide-eyes, etc. or a
general inability to perform any sort task. EG performed the control face-anchored sort task
perfectly; he could detect perceptual differences in the expressions and match a scowl to a
scowl, a pout to a pout, and so forth. In light of these findings, his performance on the free
sort indicated that without access to emotion concept knowledge, he did not understand the
psychological meaning of facial expressions at a level more nuanced than simple affective
valence.
Patients FZ and CP
Emotional free sort
Both FZ and CP performed similarly to EG on the emotional free sort. FZ produced 4 piles
(see Figure 4), which he labeled “happy,” “sad,” “normal,” and a fourth pile that he
variously called “sad,” “mad,” and “questioning” at different points throughout the study
(indicating that what these faces shared in common was negative valence). Like EG, FZ
made more errors in which he confused negative faces with one another (scowling, pouting,
wide-eyed and wrinkle-nosed faces) than did controls [t(43)=2.53, p<.02; see Table 1], but
he never confused negative faces for positive (smiling) faces.
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CP made four piles (see Figure 4), which she labeled “funny/happy,” “regular,” “not up,”
and “really not up at all.” Like EG and FZ, CP made more errors in which she confused
negative faces with one another (scowling, pouting, wide-eyed and wrinkle-nosed faces)
than did controls [t(43)=1.60, p<.058; one-tailed; see Table 1], but she rarely confused
negative faces for positive (smiling) faces. Although CP produced one pile that contained
predominantly scowling faces on the emotion free sort, we do not think this is evidence that
she understood the category of anger. First, CP did not produce this pile spontaneously. She
began the task by sorting faces into three piles representing positive, neutral and negative
affect (pile 3 and 4 were a single pile), but she randomly split this negative pile into two
negative piles following a cue from researchers that she could check her piles before moving
on. The fact that she split her pile into additional piles following a cue from the researchers
suggests that she might have realized that there should be more categories in the set (even if
she could not perceive them). Second, the name that CP spontaneously used to label these
two piles implies that she did not see the faces in pile 3 as categorically different from the
faces in pile 4. Rather, the labels “not up” and “really not up” suggest that she experienced
the faces in her two negative piles as differing in intensity of unpleasantness (although the
faces she placed in this pile were not rated as more intense by a separate group of healthy
individuals). Finally, as we discuss below, CP did not show a consistent pattern of
distinguishing scowling faces from other negative faces in the subsequent sort tasks that she
and FZ performed.
At first blush, it might also appear that both FZ and CP were able to specifically perceive
disgust because they placed all wrinkled-nose faces in a single pile in the free sort task, but
it is unlikely that they were displaying discrete emotion perception. When asked to perform
later sorts (e.g., the number and word anchored sorts), neither FZ nor CP continued to place
wrinkled nose faces into a single pile (e.g., see Figure 6 for a depiction of CP’s number-
anchored sort, where she places wrinkled nose faces in 3 of the 4 negative piles she creates),
indicating instability in their perception of these faces.
Face-anchored sort
Like EG, FZ and CP completed the face-anchored sort to ensure that they could in fact
distinguish the perceptual differences on the negative faces.3 Both FZ and CP performed
better on this task than they had on the emotion free sort task (see Table 2), indicating that
their performance on the emotion free sort was unlikely to stem from the inability to detect
perceptual differences on the faces. Like EG, their performance suggested that they could
detect differences between facial expressions but did not understand the psychological
meaning beyond basic affective valence.
Number-anchored sort
FZ and CP performed the number-anchored sort to provide additional support for the
interpretation that they did not perceive six meaningful categories in the test stimuli (even
when they were cued to the correct number). FZ made five piles corresponding to affect
3FZ and CP performed the face-anchored sort after the number-anchored sort, although we discuss their performance on the face-
anchored sort first for ease of comparison with EG (who did not perform a number-anchor sort). Otherwise, the control sorts are
discussed in the order in which they were implemented during the testing session.
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(one pile for smiling faces, one for neutral faces, and four piles containing various mixes of
negative faces in which he confused scowling, pouting, wide-eyed and wrinkle-nosed faces;
see Table 2 for errors). CP made six piles corresponding to affect (one pile for smiling faces,
one for neutral faces, and four piles containing various mixes of negative faces in which she
confused scowling, pouting, wide-eyed and wrinkle-nosed faces; see Table 2 for errors).
Notably, neither patient seemed to think that six categories were appropriate for describing
the perceptual categories present in the face set. FZ chose not to use the sixth anchor during
his sort and CP spontaneously asked why we had asked her to sort the stimuli into so many
piles. This number-anchor sort also allowed us to observe the instability in both patients’
negative piles across sort tasks. For instance, although CP produced one pile in the free sort
that contained more scowling faces than the other pile, these scowling faces were distributed
across three negative piles in the number-anchored sort, indicating that she did not in fact
perceive them as members of a single coherent emotion category (see Figure 5).
The instability in sorting that FZ and CP demonstrated from one task to the next is similar to
the instability in sorting that was observed in the patient LEW, who became aphasic after a
stroke (Roberson et al., 1999). LEW produced different piles when asked to sort faces across
three different instances. These findings suggest that without access to the meaning of
words, patients cannot make reliable psychological interpretations of discrete emotional
facial expressions across instances. In comparison to the earlier work with LEW, our
findings are novel in that our patients demonstrated stable affect perception across sort tasks,
even as they could not reliably distinguish sadness, fear, disgust, and anger from one another
across tasks. Moreover, unlike LEW, who had deficits in lexical retrieval but not semantic
memory, our patients’ lack of discrete emotion concept knowledge availability provides the
best test of the hypothesis that discrete emotion concept knowledge is necessary for discrete
emotion perception (but not affect perception).
Word-anchored sort
FZ and CP next performed the word-anchored sort to address the possibilities that 1) they
did not find discrete emotion categories to be the most “meaningful” categories in the set,
but could sort by these categories when prompted, 2) that they were merely unable to
spontaneously retrieve the words to support discrete emotion perception, but that they could
perform the task if we provided the correct words for them. Adding emotion words to a
discrete emotion perception task almost always improves healthy adults’ performance: they
are much more “accurate” at detecting the discrete emotional meaning of a facial action
(e.g., a scowl) when asked to select the meaning from a list of words (e.g., “anger,”
“disgust,” “fear,” “happiness,” “sadness”) than when they are asked to spontaneously
generate the label themselves (Russell, 1994). Adults remember facial expressions as being
more intense exemplars of a particular discrete emotion (e.g., happiness) when they have
previously paired that facial expression with a word (e.g., “happy”) than a non-word (e.g., a
nonsense word) (Halberstadt et al., 2009; Halberstadt & Niedenthal, 2001). Providing labels
for facial expressions can also impose the perception of categories where it did not exist
before (Fugate et al., 2010) in healthy adults. Even young children are more accurate when
asked to match a face (e.g., scowl) to a word (e.g., “anger”) than when asked to match a face
to another face depicting the same expression (e.g., another scowl) (Russell & Widen,
Lindquist et al. Page 13






















2002). Yet anchoring the piles with emotion words did not improve FZ’s and CP’s
performance (see Table 2); their error rate increased above the level observed in the face-
anchored sort. Words did not help FZ and CP because they did not understand their meaning
(e.g., CP spontaneously asked “what is anger?” as if she had never encountered the word
before). Even our attempts to describe a word’s meaning to patients (e.g., “anger is a feeling
you have when someone does something bad to you”) did not help, and patients could not
use this information to make meaning of the facial expressions posed in the photographs.
These findings confirm that our patients did in fact have impaired concepts for emotion.
Identity sort
Finally, FZ and CP performed the identity sort to rule out alternate interpretations that they
did not understand the instructions of a sort task, had visual deficits that impaired
performance on the emotional sort tasks, or had general executive impairments that would
interfere with any sorting task. Both FZ and CP sorted the faces perfectly by identity
(producing 0 errors), ruling out that their performance on the previous tasks were caused by
other cognitive or perceptual deficits unrelated to emotion concept knowledge.
Conclusion
Our findings are consistent with rapidly growing evidence that emotion concept knowledge
supports the normal perception of discrete emotion categories such as anger, disgust, fear,
sadness, etc. (for reviews see Barrett, 2011; Barrett, Lindquist, et al., 2007; Lindquist &
Gendron, 2013; Roberson et al., 2010; Widen, 2013; Widen & Russell, 2008b). Previous
findings from our labs indicate that temporarily impairing access to and use of emotion
concept knowledge in healthy young individuals impairs discrete emotion categorization
(Lindquist et al., 2006), influencing even the formation of emotion percepts from the
structural features of posed faces (Gendron et al., 2012). By contrast, adding words to a task
helps healthy participants perceive categorical boundaries between posed affective facial
expressions where they otherwise could not (Fugate et al. 2010). Children (Widen &
Russell, 2003) and adults (Nook et al., in prep) are more accurate at pairing a scowl with the
word “anger” than with another scowling face, suggesting that words signifying concept
knowledge might actually add something to the perception of a discrete emotion,
transforming a percept of a negative face into a discrete percept of anger. Even
neuroimaging evidence is consistent with the idea that concept knowledge plays a role in
constructing instances of discrete emotion: brain areas involved in the representation of
semantic knowledge such as the medial prefrontal cortex, anterior temporal lobe, medial
temporal lobe, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Binder et al., 2009) are routinely involved
in both emotional perceptions and experiences across the neuroimaging literature (Lindquist,
Wager, Kober, et al., 2012). Our data thus add a crucial dimension to this literature by
demonstrating that adults with semantic impairment due to anterior temporal lobe
neurodegeneration cannot perceive anger, sadness, fear, or disgust as discrete emotions in
people’s faces.
Previous research has documented general decreases in discrete emotion perception
accuracy in patients with semantic dementia when they are asked to pair faces with words
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(Calabria et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2012; Rosen et al., 2002). To date, these data have been
interpreted with the understanding that language is epiphenomenal to emotion: deficits
observed on discrete emotion perception tasks are thought to stem from difficulties labeling
stimuli, not from difficulties in discrete emotion perception per se (e.g., Miller et al., 2012).
Our findings show that patients’ inability to perceive discrete emotion is directly linked to
their semantic impairments in a task that did not require the use of emotion words, and that
cannot be attributable to other deficits such as loss of executive control, prosopagnosia,
visuospatial impairments, or affective deficits.
Our findings might, at first blush, seem inconsistent with other recent evidence from
frontotemporal dementia (FTD) patients (including, but not limited to, semantic dementia
patients) that specific patterns of neurodegeneration spanning frontal, temporal, and limbic
regions are associated with impairments in labeling specific emotions (Kumfor et al., 2013).
For instance, Kumfor et al. found that across patients with semantic dementia and other
variants of FTD, deficits in labeling wide-eyed faces as “fear” were relatively more
associated with neurodegeneration in the amygdala whereas deficits in labeling wrinkled-
nose faces as “disgust” were relatively more associated with neurodegeneration in the insula.
Although the authors took this as evidence for the biological basicness of certain discrete
emotion categories, these findings might not ultimately be at odds with our own findings.
Because the authors looked for areas of neurodegeneration that correlated with impairments
in the perception of specific discrete emotions (while controlling for relationships between
brain areas and impairments in perceiving other discrete emotions) they were not likely to
reveal brain areas, such as the anterior temporal lobe, that are general to impairments in
perceiving all negative discrete emotions. Growing evidence demonstrates that concept
knowledge is represented in a “hub and spokes” manner (Patterson et al., 2007), in which
the anterior temporal lobe serves as a “hub” to a set of “spokes” consisting of patterns of
brain activity spanning other regions involved in sensation, motor behavior, affect and
language, such as those investigated by Kumfor and colleagues. Although speculation at this
point, Kumfor et al.’s (2013) findings and our own might thus be evidence for both “spokes”
and “hubs” in the representation of emotion concept knowledge—concept knowledge about
certain discrete emotions might be supported by distributed and somewhat distinctive
patterns of brain activity, but these patterns might converge functionally in the anterior
temporal lobe. Although research to date has not explicitly assessed the distributed patterns
of brain activity involved in representing perceptions of different discrete emotions, meta-
analytic evidence from our own lab suggests that it is quite distributed (Lindquist et al.,
2012). Other evidence from cognitive neuroscience is suggestive that a hub and spokes
formation might represent emotion knowledge. fMRI studies demonstrate distributed
patterns of brain activity associated with perceptions of other semantic categories such as
bicycles, bottles, athletes, etc. (Huth et al., 2012), but focal lesions to the anterior temporal
lobes (as occurs in semantic dementia) impair perception of these categories (Lambon Ralph
et al., 2010). Future research should thus investigate the extent to which concept knowledge
of emotion is represented by distributed, multi-modal, brain areas united by an amodal hub
in the anterior temporal lobe.
Importantly, our findings demonstrate something important that previous findings assessing
emotion perception in semantic dementia patients have not: Despite their semantic
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impairments, patients in our case study were still able to perceive affective valence in faces.
These findings suggest that perceptions of affective valence are more psychologically basic
than (i.e., superordinate to) perceptions of discrete emotion and counter basic emotion views
claiming that valence is a descriptive “umbrella” term that is applied to a face after it is
perceived as an instance of discrete emotion (e.g., that a person needs to know that a face is
fearful to know it is unpleasant; Keltner & Ekman, 2000). It’s possible to argue that affect
perceptions are just easier than discrete emotion perceptions. Then again, it is equally
possible to claim that valence perception it is more difficult than discrete emotion perception
(because it involves seeing similarity across perceptually distinct facial expressions).
Regardless, patients persisted in making valence distinctions, even when subsequent control
tasks provided extra structure and removed cognitive load by cuing patients to the number,
appearance, and even names of the discrete emotion categories, suggesting that affect
perceptions were all patients were capable of.
The finding that affect is superordinate to judgments of discrete emotion is consistent with
several sources of data. First, this finding is consistent with behavioral research in healthy
adults demonstrating that the dimension of valence describes similarities in discrete emotion
categories (Russell & Barrett, 1999). Second, this finding is consistent with evidence
showing that infants, toddlers, and non-human primates, who lack sophisticated language
capacity, can perceive affective valence in faces, voices, and bodies even when they do not
reliably distinguish discrete emotional expressions from one another (for a discussion
Lindquist, Wager, Bliss-Moreau, et al., 2012). Only as children acquire the meaning of
emotion words such as “anger,” “fear,” “sadness” and “disgust” with normal development
do they acquire the ability to reliably distinguish between scowling, wide eyed, pouting and
wrinkled nosed faces as expressions of these categories (Widen & Russell, 2008a). Third,
this finding is consistent with cross-cultural evidence that all cultures perceive valence on
faces, even amidst differences in the specific discrete emotions they perceive on faces
(Russell, 1991) or even differences in whether discrete emotions are perceived at all
(Gendron et al., under revision). Finally, similar to other “last in, first out” theories of
development vs. neurodegeneration, our findings are consistent with other research on
semantic dementia documenting the progressive “pruning” of concepts over the course of
disease progression from the semantically subordinate level (e.g., lion vs. tiger) to the basic
level (e.g., cat vs. dog) to the superordinate level (e.g., animal vs. plant) (Hodges et al.,
1995; Rogers et al., 2006). To our knowledge, our findings are the first to demonstrate a
similar pattern of “pruning” for emotion concepts. Although it is not addressable in the
present study, future research might use longitudinal methods to specifically investigate the
“pruning” hypothesis as it pertains to discrete emotion v. valence perception. If valence
judgments rely on concept knowledge, and valence concepts are superordinate to discrete
emotion concepts, then we might expect valence perception to diminish over the course of
neurodegeneration, following discrete emotion perception. Yet if intact valence perception
relies on other psychological mechanisms besides concept knowledge per se (e.g.,
“mirroring” or mimicry of others’ affective states that occurs in the so-called “mirroring”
network of the brain; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012) then it is possible that valence perception
will be maintained over the course of the disease.
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The observation that people with semantic dementia have preserved affect perception but
impaired discrete emotion perception has important implications for both basic and applied
science. These findings cannot be accommodated by “basic emotion” accounts (Ekman et
al., 1987; Keltner & Ekman, 2000; Lewis, 1993; Matsumoto et al., 2008; Sauter et al., 2010)
which assume that emotional expressions are “psychological universals and constitute a set
of basic, evolved functions, that are shared by all humans” and which have evolved from
early primate communication (cf., Sauter et al., 2010). Although our findings run contrary to
basic emotion models, our study was not designed to specifically test other models of
emotion, such as appraisal models, that themselves make no predictions about the role of
language and conceptual knowledge in emotion perception. Appraisal models make specific
predictions about the role of appraisal “checks” (Scherer & Ellgring, 2007) or “action
tendencies” (Frijda, 1987) for the production of facial expressions. Aside from evidence
suggesting that healthy adults make appraisal-consistent personality inferences about
scowling, pouting and smiling faces (Hareli & Hess, 2010), there is little evidence
specifically assessing the role of appraisal checks in emotion perception. Relatively more
studies have addressed the role of action tendencies during emotion perception, with most
studies focusing on the perceiver’s general approach v. avoidance behaviors following the
perception of discrete emotion in a posed face (e.g., wide-eyed v. scowling faces; Adams et
al., 2006; Marsh et al., 2005). It thus remains a possibility that patients could sort by
appraisal checks or action tendencies if prompted to do so, but such a question is beyond the
scope of our study. Our data demonstrate that participants did not spontaneously sort faces
based on appraisals (e.g., whether the person expressing emotion has control over the
situation, whether the person expressing emotion finds the situation certain) or action
tendencies (e.g., whether the person expressing emotion is likely to flee the situation or
would make the perceiver want to flee the situation). Nor did any of the patients in our
sample make comments related to appraisals or action tendencies when sorting faces (e.g.,
none said “he looks uncertain” or “he is going to run away”). One possibility is that the
content of appraisals concerning the situation (e.g., knowing whether the situation in which
emotion occurs is certain, controllable, etc.) and knowledge about which action tendencies
accompany certain emotions are part of the discrete emotion concept knowledge (Barrett &
Lindquist, 2008; Barrett, Mesquita, et al., 2007; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008) that becomes
impaired in semantic dementia. This hypothesis would be important to test in future
research.
In conclusion, our data suggest that the 1) perception of affect and 2) categorization that is
supported by emotion concept knowledge (Barrett, 2006; Barrett, Lindquist, et al., 2007;
Lindquist & Gendron, 2013; Russell, 2003) are both important “ingredients” in normal
emotion perception. These findings augment the growing argument that discrete emotions
are psychologically constructed events that are flexibly produced in the mind of a perceiver
and dependent on context, culture and language, rather than innate modules for specific
invariant categories (Barrett, 2006, 2012; Barrett, Lindquist, et al., 2007; Lindquist &
Gendron, 2013). Accordingly, it seems worth investigating in future research whether the
discrete emotion perception deficits that have been documented in aging (Ruffman et al.,
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2008) and in patients with neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., autism; Baron-Cohen &
Wheelright, 2004; e.g., schizophrenia; Kohler et al., 2010; e.g., Alzheimer’s Disease;
Phillips et al., 2010) originate from changes in more fundamental psychological processes
(e.g., conceptual processing and/or affective processing). Finally, the results presented here
suggest that the theories of discrete emotion being disseminated in textbooks and scientific
papers throughout the Western world—and being used to train security agents and other
government officials—should be refined by considering the role of discrete emotion concept
knowledge in discrete emotion perception.
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Figure 1. MRI scans of patients EG, FZ and CP
T1-weighted MRI scans of (a) patient EG (b) patient FZ (c) and patient CP showing left-
lateralized anterior temporal lobe atrophy; images are shown in radiological orientation (the
left hemisphere appears on the right hand side of the image).
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Figure 2. Example of face stimuli
Examples of face stimuli from the IASLab set used in the face sort tasks.
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Figure 3. Examples of a control participants’ performance on the free sort task
A 69-year old man made six piles to represent the six categories.
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Figure 4. Patient’s performance on the emotion free sort task
In EG’s free sort, the first pile contained predominantly happy faces, the second pile
contained predominantly neutral faces and the third pile contained predominantly negative
faces (scowling, pouting, wide-eyed and wrinkle-nosed faces). In FZ’s free sort, the first pile
contained all happy faces, the second pile contained all neutral faces, and the third and
fourth piles contained all negative faces. In CP’s free sort, the first pile contained
predominantly happy faces, the second pile contained all neutral faces, and the third and
fourth piles contained all negative faces.
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When asked to sort faces into six piles anchored with the numbers 1–6, CP created one pile
for positive faces, one for neutral faces and four for negative faces. This task indicated the
instability in her sorting from one instance to the next.
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